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CCP Response to Ofgem Consultation on Targeted Charging Review 
 
The authors welcome the opportunity to respond to Ofgem consultation on the best way 
of setting the transmission and distribution residual charges. We agree with Ofgem’s 
basic approach to fairness, which reflects our own assessment of fairness in distribution 
charges in a more general context, prepared for BEUC.1 We also agree that a major 
principle behind recovering costs which are ‘legacy’ rather than forward looking costs, 
as in the Ofgem consultation, should be to distort consumption and investment decisions 
as little as possible. Our report majors on domestic customers, most of whom are more 
likely to alter their demand than to decide to leave the network altogether as a result 
of price changes. Therefore we agree that the principle of least distortion, as well as 
the other criteria outlined by Ofgem (in particular practicality and proportionality) 
indicate that a per customer charge is an appropriate basis for ‘residual charges’. We 
do not comment specifically on Embedded Benefits, but agree that similar principles 
should apply. 
 
The focus of this response is to take a closer look at the distributional impacts of 
Ofgem’s preferred option of a fixed charge to recover residual costs, as compared to 
alternative charging options, on domestic customers with different energy usage 
patterns. Therefore this response is directly related to questions 4, 8 and 10 (a,b). The 
implications for bills of notional households with some specific consumption 
characteristics are illustrated in our report for a variety of charging methodologies. 
Although the report covers the wider issue of allocating both forward looking and 
residual costs through distribution charges, and additional principles such as efficient 
signals for future costs are relevant, in this response to Ofgem, we consider residual 
costs only.  
 
Following the example used by Ofgem when illustrating residual bills of domestic 
customers in a typical DNO area,2 we assume that the average residual to be recovered 
from a domestic customer is £64 per year.3 Ofgem’s preferred option, a fixed charge, 
allocates preciously a bill of £64 to each domestic customers (except Economy 7), 
regardless of their consumption characteristics, and we agree that this method meets 
the principle of reducing harmful distortions as outlined by Ofgem. Our question of 
interest is how other charging options would allocate the same residual costs across 
households and the associated implications from a distributional perspective. This may 
complement Ofgem’s discussion on vulnerable consumers, especially if certain 
correlations exist between households’ energy use characteristics and their socio-
economic characteristics such as income. 
 
With a similar modelling approach, our simulation model consists eight ‘notional’ 
households that differ from each other in one or more ways regarding annual 
                                                          
1 Lu L & Waddams Price C (2018) "Designing Distribution Network Tariffs that are Fair for Different Consumer 
Groups: Report for BEUC". Available at 
http://competitionpolicy.ac.uk/documents/8158338/28406552/CCP+report+for+BEUC.pdf/8aeb45ae-3e8b-
9b81-0441-65a940406ba3. 
2 Ofgem (2018) Targeted charging review: Minded to decision and draft impact assessment, Figure 11, p.4. 
3 This assumption can be easily modified, for example, with data from a different DNO area. 
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contractual capacity (low, average, high), annual (net) consumption (very low, low, 
average, high), peak time consumption and whether there is any solar system installed.4  
For this response, we have adapted our wider analysis to assign values to consumption 
levels using figures from Ofgem’s analysis.5 For illustrative purposes, to emphasise the 
distributional consequences of different charging methodologies, this is based on a 
static analysis which assumes that demand is constant across the tariffs. It is worth 
noting that we do not assume a single connection capacity for all households or assume 
capacity levels and volumetric consumption levels are always positively correlated. 
Instead, the notional households in our model present different combinations of 
capacity and consumption levels.   
 
Regarding the charging options, in addition to ‘pure’ volume-based, capacity-based 
and fixed charges, we consider hybrid options containing more than one charging 
components, similar to Ofgem’s “Mostly…partially…” charges.6 These charging options 
reflect the variety of tariff structures that are currently used in different European 
countries and the US to recover distribution network costs. For example, in charging 
distribution network tariffs to domestic customers, Romania currently uses a purely 
volumetric approach (like that currently applied to residual charges in the UK); while 
the Netherlands imposes a combination of capacity and fixed charges, with no 
volumetric element.7 
 
Given an average residual bill per customer per year of £64, we simulate the residual 
bills under other options for the eight notional households. While the selection of 
households means that each of them represents 12.5% of the population in our model, 
it should be noted that we do not imply equal weighting of these households, or the 
bills generated, in the wider population. 
 
Figure 1 presents an overview of how different charging options distribute the same 
total residual costs to different households, based on an average bill of £64. More 
specifically, each bar represents a household’s bill for recovering residual costs, and 
each set of bars depicts bills for different households under a single charging option. As 
we can see, 100F, Ofgem’s preferred option, achieves equality in residual bills among 
domestic customers, by definition; all the other options distribute residual costs 
according to some measure of system use. We agree with Ofgem that while some may 
regard charges linked to the use of system as fairer and more justifiable, residual costs 
are also more easily avoided under these charges, though we have excluded any direct 
demand response to different tariffs from our analysis. We note the lower bills under 
usage based charging for the three households in our model with very low net 
consumption who have installed solar PV. 
                                                          
4 For a detailed summary of household profiles, see Table 1 in Appendices.  
5 Frontier Economics (2018) Distributional and wider system impacts of reform to residual charges, Figure 7, 
p.14. 
6 For a detailed summary of charging options, see Table 2 in Appendices.  
7 For a summary of key features of distribution network tariffs charged to household in different locations, see 
Table 3 in Appendices. Also see Section 3.2 in Lu L & Waddams Price C (2018) "Designing Distribution Network 
Tariffs that are Fair for Different Consumer Groups: Report for BEUC" for detailed case studies. Available at 
http://competitionpolicy.ac.uk/documents/8158338/28406552/CCP+report+for+BEUC.pdf/8aeb45ae-3e8b-
9b81-0441-65a940406ba3. 
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LL – low capacity, low consumption; HL – high capacity, low consumption; LH – low capacity, high consumption; HH – high 
capacity, high consumption; AA – average capacity, average consumption; LvL –  low capacity, very low consumption; HvL – 
high capacity, very low consumption; LvLf – low capacity, very low consumption, able to feed into the grid if allowed 
Figure 1. Residual bills (£) under each charging option 
 
 
 
LvL –  low capacity, very low consumption; HvL – high capacity, very low consumption; LvLf – low capacity, very low 
consumption, able to feed into the grid if allowed 
Figure 2. Residual bills (£) for households with solar PV 
 
To take a closer look at these three households with very low volumetric 
consumption because of their solar PV, we present their residual bills under different 
charging options in Figure 2. These three households receive the lowest bills under 
volume-based charging option (100V), which may lead to substantial distributional 
concerns, as the costs they have ‘avoided’ are shifted to other consumers who do not 
benefit from the technology. In this context, we agree that a fixed charge is a desirable 
option in reducing distortion, as it reduces options for avoiding residual. We also note 
that capacity-based charges (100C) perform well in reducing distortion, in accordance 
with Ofgem’s second leading option. However, as noted above, the capacity levels 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
100V 100C 100F 30F70V 30F70C 50C50V 20F40C40V 30F70Vt
£/year Residual bills (£) under each charging option
LL HL LH HH AA LvL HvL LvLf
0
50
100
150
200
100V 100C 100F 30F70V 30F70C 50C50V 20F40C40V 30F70Vt
£/year Residual bills (£) for households with solar PV
LvL HvL LvLf
5 
 
featured in our model are not typically correlated with consumption levels. Where 
capacity bands correlate closely with volume levels, capacity-based charges might 
perform less well, since they offer more opportunity for avoidance. 
 
Figure 3 shows an alternative way of presenting simulated bills, which is by 
household. Each set of bars illustrates the residual bills that a household receives under 
different charging options. This allows the observations of bill implications of different 
charging options, given customers’ specific energy usage characteristics. 
 
 
LL – low capacity, low consumption; HL – high capacity, low consumption; LH – low capacity, high consumption; HH – high 
capacity, high consumption; AA – average capacity, average consumption; LvL –  low capacity, very low consumption; HvL – 
high capacity, very low consumption; LvLf – low capacity, very low consumption, able to feed into the grid if allowed 
Figure 3. Residual bills (£) for each household  
 
Our results are largely consistent with Ofgem’s estimates. A fixed compared to a 
volumetric tariff is likely to increase the residual bill for customers who have the lowest 
levels of system demand and electricity consumption, while customers with average 
levels of demand and consumption are likely to benefit from a reduced bill. It is not 
clear whether this may cause distributional concerns due to vulnerability. While 
electricity consumption and income are positively correlated, there is considerable 
variation within each income level, as Ofgem notes. Nevertheless, we note that some 
hybrid options could also reduce distortion considerably if compared to a baseline of 
volume-based charging, and they may offer less drastic changes in bills (increase or 
decrease) than charging options containing a single charging component. 
 
If distributional implication is the main concern, one alternative way to recover 
residual costs is to use increasing block tariffs, in which most costs may be recovered 
from high volume users, who are more likely to be those most able to bear them. 
However such a pricing system has practical difficulties,8 and is not likely to meet the 
criterion of Ofgem’s review.   
                                                          
8 The practical challenges of increasing block tariffs regarding their designs and consumer responses are 
discussed in depth, albeit in the context of residential water consumption, in Lu L, Deller D, and Hviid M (2018) 
“Price and Behavioural Signals to Encourage Household Water Conservation: Implications for the UK”, Water 
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Appendices  
 
Household 
abbreviation 
Contractual 
capacity  
(kW/year) 
Volumetric9 
consumption 
(kWh/year) 
 Ratio of 
consumption (kWh) 
at peak time  
Solar PV Amount fed into 
grid 
(kWh/year) 
LL Low  
(4) 
Low 
(1900) 
1/2 NO - 
HL High 
(10)  
Low  
(1900) 
2/3 NO - 
LH Low  
(4) 
High 
(4600)  
1/2 NO - 
HH 
  
High 
(10)  
High 
(4600)   
2/3 NO - 
AA Average  
(6) 
Average 
(3100)   
1/2 NO - 
LvL Low  
(4) 
Very low  
(500) 
1 YES 0 
HvL High  
(10) 
Very low 
(500) 
1 YES 0 
LvLf Low  
(4) 
Very low 
(500) 
1 YES 500 
Total consumption (kWh/year) 19000 
Total contractual capacity (kW/year) 52 
Average revenue per household (€/year) 200 
Total revenue (€/year) 1600 
LL – low capacity, low consumption; HL – high capacity, low consumption; LH – low capacity, high consumption; HH – 
high capacity, high consumption; AA – average capacity, average consumption; LvL –  low capacity, very low 
consumption; HvL – high capacity, very low consumption; LvLf – low capacity, very low consumption, able to feed into 
the grid if allowed 
Table 1. Notional households10 
 
Tariff scenario Fixed 
component 
(£/year) 
Capacity 
component 
(£/kW) 
Volume 
component 
(£/kWh) 
ToU 
100V - - 100% NO 
100C - 100% - NO 
100F 100% - - NO 
30F70V 30% - 70% NO 
30F70C 30% 70% - NO 
50C50V - 50% 50% NO 
20F40C40V 20% 40% 40% NO 
30F70Vt 30% - 70% YES 
Table 2. Stylised charging options11 
                                                          
Resources Management. Available at https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs11269-018-2133-
z.pdf. 
9 Figures in red are used in Ofgem’s analysis, see footnote 5. 
10 Adapted from Table 6 in Lu L & Waddams Price C (2018) "Designing Distribution Network Tariffs that are Fair 
for Different Consumer Groups: Report for BEUC". Available at 
http://competitionpolicy.ac.uk/documents/8158338/28406552/CCP+report+for+BEUC.pdf/8aeb45ae-3e8b-
9b81-0441-65a940406ba3. 
11 Adapted from Table 7 in Lu L & Waddams Price C (2018) "Designing Distribution Network Tariffs that are Fair 
for Different Consumer Groups: Report for BEUC". Available at 
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Case Tariff component Tariff charging basis  Net 
metering 
Main 
responsibility in 
setting tariffs 
Fixed Capacity Volume  
(weight) 
Non-linear  Time-of-Use  
Italy YES YES YES (66%) YES NO YES NRA 
Portugal NO YES YES (62%) NO YES NO NRA 
Romania NO NO YES (100%) NO NO NO NRA 
The Netherlands YES YES NO (0%) NO NO YES NRA and DSOs 
Norway YES  NO YES (70%) NO NO NO DSOs 
California (PG&E) YES NO YES (n/a) YES YES YES DSO(PG&E) 
Table 3. Key features of household distribution network tariffs in selected cases 
 
                                                          
http://competitionpolicy.ac.uk/documents/8158338/28406552/CCP+report+for+BEUC.pdf/8aeb45ae-3e8b-
9b81-0441-65a940406ba3. 
